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ABSTRACT Efforts to rescale governance arrangements to foster sustainable development
are rarely simple in their consequences, an out-turn examined in this paper through an
analysis of how the governance of renewable energy in the UK has been impacted by the
devolution of power to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Theoretically, attention is
given to the ways in which multiple modes of governing renewable energy, and the inter-
actions between modes and objects of governance, together configure the scalar organiz-
ation of renewable energy governance. Our findings show how the devolved
governments have created new, sub-national renewable energy strategies and targets,
yet their effectiveness largely depends on UK-wide systems of subsidy. Moreover, shared
support for particular objects of governance—large-scale, commercial electricity gener-
ation facilities—has driven all the devolved government to centralize and expedite the
issuing of consents. This leads to a wider conclusion. While the level at which environ-
mental problems are addressed can affect how they are governed, what key actors believe
about the objects of governance can mediate the effects of any rescaling processes.
KEY WORDS: Scale, governance, renewable energy, UK, devolution
1. Introduction
A persistent theme in the analysis of environmental governance is that insti-
tutional arrangements are a poor ‘fit’ to the scale of the problems concerned
(Benson & Jordan, 2010; Moss & Newig, 2010; Sovacool & Brown, 2009). This is
often attributed to the governmental level at which problems are addressed
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(‘too localized’, ‘too centralized’), or the governance unit is criticized for not
matching the spatial scale of the problem (Butler & Macey, 1996). Not surprisingly
therefore, the rescaling of governance arrangements has been a key theme in
environmental policy, with much faith that rescaling the locus of action—to ‘com-
munities’, ‘city-region’, ‘bio-region’, ‘watershed’, etc.—will better serve sustain-
able development.
However, if calls for rescaling are common-place, the practical outcomes can be
inconclusive or disappointing (Marvin & Guy, 1997), and it is a goal of this paper to
help explain why this might be so. In particular, we suggest that there are often
unrealistic expectations of the impacts of specific acts of rescaling because the
broader governance implications are commonly overlooked. One factor is that
moves to rescale governance arrangements are often partial in their effects
because the promotion of sustainable development invariably affects hetero-
geneous actors, operating in multiple arenas (Watson, Bulkeley, & Hudson, 2008).
While rescaling may appear to enhance the agency of actors operating at the new
scale, other actors and their agendas may be left unchanged (Degeling, 1995). There-
fore, there are always questions of whether rescaling improves the alignment of
actions across these multiple arenas (Sovacool & Brown, 2009). A second and
related issue is whether rescaling affects the conceptions of sustainable develop-
ment around which any new alignment might take place (Cowell & Owens, 1998).
Questions about rescaling in environmental governance have typically been
asked of environmental resource management, including water (Moss & Newig,
2010), hazards (such as coastal flooding, May et al., 1996) or waste management
(Bulkeley, Watson, & Hudson, 2007; Bulkeley, Watson, Hudson, & Weaver, 2005;
Watson et al., 2008; Wilson, McDougall, & Willmore, 2001), but rarely for a key
domain for promoting sustainability: renewable energy. Renewable energy
(wind, hydro, solar, wave/tidal and biofuels) is widely seen as central to sustain-
able development, especially for mitigating climate change (Inter-Governmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2014). Yet in scalar terms, research to date on transitions
to more sustainable forms of energy has exhibited a strong methodological nation-
alism (Spa¨th & Rohracher, 2014), with relatively little attention to how systems of
energy provision unfold across multiple governance levels and how this in turn
affects the scope for change (Bridge, Bouzarovski, Bradshaw, & Eyre, 2013,
Coenen, Benneworth, & Truffer, 2012, p. 969). This is an important deficit, as pro-
moting renewable energy is a complex governance challenge, requiring an align-
ment of actions—regulatory, market and social—with different socio-spatial
dynamics (Wu¨stenhagen, Wolsink, & Bu¨rer, 2007).
Our specific focus here is the intersections between the governance of renew-
able energy and processes of devolution within the UK initiated in 1998. Devolu-
tion is an insightful but unusual context in which to examine the governance
effects of rescaling. It is certainly significant within the UK, as elected govern-
ments at sub-national1 level for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales acquired
competencies previously exercised by central government. What makes it analyti-
cally unusual is that devolution was never an attempt to create a better insti-
tutional ‘fit’ (Moss & Newig, 2010) for the governance of energy2 in order to
address key policy objectives such as the (then) emergent issues of decarboniza-
tion or energy security. British devolution thus exemplifies an important reality
of environmental governance, in that the pursuit of functionally preferable
scalar arrangements for addressing environmental problems unfolds alongside
constant spatial churning in governance arrangements (levels and boundaries)
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driven by other political and economic agendas, in which environment is a
subsidiary concern (Cowell & Owens, 2006). Moreover, sub-national government
remains an under-researched sphere for analysing the pursuit of sustainability
(Van den Brande, Bruyninckx, Happaerts, 2012).
Our core questions are as follows. How far has devolution facilitated a rescal-
ing of governance arrangements for renewable energy in the UK and what have
been the consequences, both for the ways in which renewable energy is governed
and for the patterns of renewable energy delivered? We make our task more tract-
able by focusing on renewably generated electricity rather than heat or transport
fuels and we also focus on capacity from larger-scale generating facilities rather
than ‘micro-renewables’. We acknowledge that this gives a partial window on
the scalar governance challenges of promoting renewable energy but our aim is
to understand how rescaling has affected the provision of actual renewable
energy in the period 1998–2013, during which time new large-scale electricity
generation capacity has predominated. Because of the analytical emphasis on
actual renewable energy capacity being installed, onshore wind often features
prominently in our account. This is because onshore wind was the fastest
growing but most controversial technology during this period, which often there-
fore had greatest influence on the governance changes we observed.
To understand the governing processes at work and their intersection with
rescaling, we utilize two sets of concepts. From Jessop (1997a, 1997b, 2005), we
take the observation that modes of governance are fundamentally bound up
with particular ‘objects’ and that this relationship shapes how states seek to
orchestrate development across their territory. From Bulkeley et al. (2005, 2007;
Watson et al., 2008), we take seriously the need to follow the multiple modes of
governing at play within a given policy area because—as noted above—not all
of the modes may rescale in concert as the level of governance activity seems to
shift, with sometimes awkward and contradictory effects. These perspectives
inform our definitions of ‘scale’. When talking of devolution rescaling the govern-
ance of renewable energy, scale refers primarily to the ‘levels’ of government and
the distribution of powers between them (Moss & Newig 2010). So, in our analysis
we pay close attention to the rescaling of powers between the UK government and
the devolved governments, but also the degree of centralization or decentraliza-
tion within the devolved areas. Inevitably, though, devolving (or centralizing)
powers also affects scale in the sense of the territorial reach of institutional
arrangements, i.e. whether certain powers apply across the UK or purely within
the devolved areas. In line with Jessop’s observations, we are also attentive to
the physical scaling of the objects being governed, their material size and areal
extent, as this can have consequences for the scalar structure of governance (see
discussion in Bridge et al., 2013).
The paper first describes our conceptual stance in more detail, then sketches
how devolution within the British state redistributed formal energy-related
powers. We then outline the research methodology. In presenting our findings,
we trace the intersections between devolution and three modes of governing
renewable energy: targets, market support and land-use planning/project con-
senting. This reveals more clearly how far and why the different devolved govern-
ments have been able to shape renewable energy within their territories, but also
how the objects of governance have influenced governance changes at all levels.
The final, concluding section considers the wider implications for sustainability
and governance rescaling.
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2. Conceptual and Institutional Context
2.1. Understanding Scalar Issues in Governance
A key challenge for interpreting the effects of governance rescaling is deciphering
its effects from within the often fragmented institutional settings in which it takes
place, and thereby understanding how, where and to what extent power is being
redistributed. To address this, we draw on two conceptual perspectives.
Our first uses Jessop’s strategic-relational approach to space and state power
and his observation that there are mutually constituting relationships between
‘modes of governance’ (the processes by which governance takes place) and the
‘objects of governance’ (those entities or goals which are the subject of govern-
ance) (Jessop, 1997a, 1997b, 2003, 2005). For Jessop (1997a, p. 105), it is difficult
to theorize about tendencies in governance since there is no governance ‘in
general’; there are only ‘definite objects of governance that are shaped in and
through definite modes of governance’. One inference from this is that the
state—seeking functional improvements or political advantage—may take differ-
ent views of the modes of governance that are appropriate for different objects. For
some, the state may be prepared to allow diversity and divergence across its ter-
ritory (innovation or local adaptation) but for others may attempt to align the
actors that shape activity in that area (Cowell & Murdoch, 1999). In such situ-
ations, state activity may take the form of a ‘dominant strategic line’ in which
national objectives are translated into effective sub-national and local action
through institutional arrangements that ‘allocate specific roles and complemen-
tary competences across different spatial scales’ (Jessop, 1997b, p. 13).
Jessop’s perspective helps us to understand how particular sectors are gov-
erned and explore the implications of rescaling governance arrangements. As
Degeling (1995) points out, the effects of any efforts to re-focus governance activity
at a different level are likely to be limited unless they also alter the institutional
biases held in place by sectors, constituted by particular discourses of expertise,
policy territories and patterns of resource allocation and commitment. One can
see how the operation of dominant strategic lines within particular sectors may
run up against efforts to reformulate certain objects, through the rescaling of gov-
ernance, to better integrate them with other goals, in particular territorial arenas
(Degeling, 1995; Murdoch & Marsden, 1995).
Previous studies of the energy sector illustrate the potential for modes and
objects of governance to be mutually configuring. Lovins (1977) famously counter-
posed ‘soft energy paths’ (i.e. diverse, small-scale, renewable energy technologies
which can be governed in a decentralized way with high levels of citizen engage-
ment) with ‘hard energy paths’ dominated by the constant expansion of supply
through large, technologically complex facilities, which entail high levels of cor-
porate and bureaucratic control and marginalize citizens. Obviously, one should
beware of the risk of deterministic explanations (Martin, 1978), but various
empirically informed analyses have traced connections between governance
modes and objects. Research has shown how the particular risks associated
with nuclear energy give it a proclivity towards centralized control and secrecy
(Blowers & Pepper, 1987), as indeed do energy mega-projects generally (see Sova-
cool & Cooper, 2013). Szarka (2007) examined the inter-relations between social
and technological dimensions of governance choices for wind power in Europe.
He noted how provision in some countries was incorporated within a ‘bulk
power’ energy pathway (2007, p. 6), based on large, industrial-scale facilities,
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delivered through an ‘international utility’ mode of development (2007, p. 183) in
which multi-national firms controlled much development, thus limiting the scope
for citizen engagement.
Bulkeley et al. (2005, 2007; Watson et al., 2008) share Jessop’s concern with the
mutually shaping effects of modes and objects of governance, but argue that his
account is overly state-centred, underplaying ‘the multiple sites through which
state power is exercised’ and ‘the relationship between developments at multiple
spatial scales’ (2007, p. 2736). Bulkeley et al. argue that a more effective grasp of
the relationship between the distribution of authority and the institutional
arrangements of governing is achieved by tracing the ‘means through which gov-
erning power is exercised and orchestrated in particular contexts’ (Bulkeley et al.,
2005, pp. 16–17). To do this, they develop an analytical framework that stresses
the multiple ‘modes of governing’ through which policy is constructed and
[potentially] contested (2005, p. 2). Multiple modes may be operating simul-
taneously within a sector. Each is constituted by particular goals, rationalities,
instruments (regulation, markets and benchmarking) and infrastructure, and
shapes the ‘social, political and material relations’ at work (Bulkeley et al., 2005,
p. 2).3
Attention to multiple modes of governing at work might better capture the
fragmented, multi-layered institutional landscape in which moves to rescale gov-
ernance systems unfold. States may seek to construct a dominant strategic line
through some modes of governance, around certain objects but not for others,
and the multi-centred nature of governance can be complicit in these effects
(Bulkeley et al., 2007). Equally, the power in actu (Latour, 1986) of different
modes is revealed by the extent to which they encounter resistance as they
move between levels, or unfold across territory.
To summarize our position, we argue that the scope for any rescaling to affect
the governance of a sphere of activity—perhaps to achieve a more effective
‘meshing’ of arrangements for a given territory—is shaped by the scalar structures
of the multiple modes of governing at work and their inter-relations with particu-
lar objects. This draws attention to how different modes orchestrate change across
space, either allowing local deviation or seeking to assert control over different
arenas. The scale and reach of the modes of governance we observe, and their
meshing, could also be viewed as constituted by networks of actors, with policy
networks analysis providing an alternative theoretical framework (see Marsh &
Rhodes, 1992; Toke, 2010). However, as we show in discussing the findings
below, the relationship between modes and objects of governance—the particular
material-institutional forms of renewable energy coming forward—can shape
network formation, and why it is that certain network configurations come to
matter.
These issues are well illustrated by devolution within the UK—being both an
output of scalar politics and also a rescaled institutional setting for the struggle to
construct effective governance arrangements for renewable energy.
2.2. Devolution and Renewable Energy
The inception of new elected assemblies and governments for Northern Ireland,
Scotland and Wales in 1998 was a significant response to the long-running chal-
lenge of managing the union that constitutes the UK (Bradbury & Mawson,
1997). The prime motives were political: to give greater democratic representation
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to important territorial identities within the UK. Although this period coincided
with high-level political attention to sustainable development, energy issues
were marginal to devolution debates (except for the Scottish National Party
(SNP), see below). Nevertheless, the arrangements for governing energy were
still impacted by devolution.
Prior to devolution, the UK Government operated decentralized administra-
tive functions in the three countries, each overseen by their respective minister.4
Thus, the main allocative principle of devolution was to transfer already decentra-
lized competencies into the hands of the newly created elected governments: the
Northern Ireland Executive, Scottish Government and Welsh Government. As a
result, the devolved governments tended to inherit as many (or as few) energy-
related powers as were exercised by their preceding minister. Such path depen-
dencies produced a rescaling exercise that was asymmetric (varying between
the devolved governments: Bogdanor, 1999) and partial.
The partiality reflects the fact that key modes of governing electricity pro-
vision have long placed the UK Government (‘Westminster’5) and its agencies
at the centre, with sub-national government playing a smaller role than in many
parts of Europe or North America. Devolution did not affect the fact that, formally,
central government retained overall responsibility for key energy policy agendas:
security of supply, competitiveness/liberalization and the main policy mechan-
isms by which these are delivered (see below). The Department of Energy and
Climate Change (DECC) is the main Westminster ministry with energy responsi-
bilities, but the Treasury is also a very powerful actor, especially for its role in lim-
iting the budget available for market support for renewable and other low-carbon
energies. Detailed regulation of electricity markets is undertaken by arms-length
bodies, such as the Office for Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), which operates
under guidelines and legislation set in Westminster, and the National Grid, which
has the role of balancing the transmission system across England, Scotland and
Wales. Northern Ireland has a full range of energy competencies, apart from
those governing nuclear (of which it has none), and therefore its governance insti-
tutions sit outside these arrangements. UK energy policy is also shaped by policy
developments at wider scales, notably European Union (EU) agendas of liberali-
zation, market integration and decarbonization. Westminster retains lead respon-
sibility for ensuring national compliance with these.
The effects of devolution are summarized in Table 1, which shows the asym-
metric nature of the settlement, the reach of any dominant strategic lines emanat-
ing from Westminster and the modes of governing to which they particularly
apply. All devolved governments acquired control over discretionary economic
spending, available inter alia for renewable energy projects, and powers over
land-use planning. These are the main electricity-related powers of the Welsh
Government, although its planning powers are more limited than the other juris-
dictions. The Scottish Government has more powers: to issue consent for major
grid lines and generating stations (50 MW or over), and some operational
control over systems of market support for renewable energy. As noted above,
energy is fully devolved to the Northern Ireland Executive, including regulation
of its grid network.
Focussing on these formal powers suggests that devolution marks a modest
rescaling of energy governance in the UK, but has impacted unevenly across mul-
tiple modes of governing. For renewable energy outcomes, much depends on how
the various modes are exercised across and within the new governmental arenas,
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and whether dominant strategic lines emerge to align the actors involved. These
are issues addressed below, where we assess the effects of devolution on three
modes of governing renewable energy; targets and strategy-making, market
support and planning/consenting.
2.3. The Research
Most of the data used in this analysis were collected during 2011/2012, utilizing a
comparative case study design encompassing Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales
and England/UK. The prime goal was to understand governance processes at
work by tracing the emergence and utilization of powers to steer renewable
energy development at the devolved government level, the intersections
between actions by devolved government and those ‘above’ (UK, EU) and
‘below’ (in local government), and the effects on renewable energy development.
We were keen to understand where actors felt compelled to tie in with Westmin-
ster arrangements, where deviation was possible and/or desirable, and how that
was rationalized.
The main data sources were: 80 semi-structured interviews with senior
figures in government (officials and ministers, working at all levels of govern-
ment), business (energy developers, grid companies, trade associations) and
Table 1. Devolution of energy-related powers in the UK
Country
Energy
policy is . . .
Provision of
market
support for
renewable
energy
Planning and
consents
(onshore)
Planning and
consentsa
(offshore)
Economic
development
spending
Northern
Ireland
Fully
devolved
Fully
devolved
Fully devolved Fully devolved Fully
devolved
Scotland Executively
devolved
Scope to
shape
delivery of
some schemes
Fully devolved Fully devolved Fully
devolved
Wales Not
devolved
No powers Partial powers
over planning
policy and
consent for
smaller schemes
(below 50MW)
Power to
determine
applications up to
1MW (exception
under Transport
and Works Act
1992)
Fully
devolved
UK &
England
Full
competence
Full
competence
Full policy
competence for
England, partial
for Wales; full
competence over
major projects
(50 MW plus)
Full competence
for English and
Welsh Waters
(subject to Welsh
exceptions,
above)
Fully
devolved
aWe set aside the issue of marine licensing powers, and consenting for onshore connections, for simpli-
city. The offshore regime applies principally to applications in UK territorial waters (i.e. up to 12 nau-
tical miles and designated renewable energy zones).
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environmental bodies (governmental and non-governmental); analysis of govern-
ment documents; correspondence and parliamentary debates; and published
energy statistics. We have treated interviewees anonymously in this research.6
3. Modes of Governing Renewable Energy
3.1. Governance by Targets?
An emphasis on formal ‘energy policy’ might lead to the conclusion that renew-
able energy governance in the UK is directed by a dominant strategic line cascad-
ing, top-down, from EU commitments. The UK was set targets under the EU
Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) to meet 15% of energy consumption
from renewable sources by 2020; a target calculated to entail that 30% of electricity
comes from renewables (HM Government, 2009). UK government Ministers
placed Europe in a nodal position:
Tony Blair7 took (a decision) at an EU summit to sign up to the legally
binding renewable energy targets for 2020 and that determines everything
else really. And so this is actually one of those areas where the overall
objective of policy is effectively in Government, a given. (EngGOV8)
One would appear to have ingredients for a governmentality of targets for
renewable energy, paralleling modes of carbon governance deemed to be
pulling the decision-making calculus of governmental actors at all levels into cen-
tralized accounting arrangements (Eadham, 2012; Hodson & Marvin, 2013). What
the experience of renewable energy shows, however, is that one should not leap to
assume that the existence of machineries of measurement means tight regulatory
direction (Bulkeley et al., 2005, 2007).
Although ‘energy policy’ is not formally devolved to all sub-national govern-
ments, each has produced energy strategies, including setting their own renew-
able energy targets.8 Although non-statutory in themselves, the devolved
governments have used these numbers to forge internal, institutional coherence
around renewable energy delivery within their territory (ScotGov2). In Northern
Ireland, the targets have provided the key rationality for cross-departmental
working in an Executive where political power-sharing structures tend to
hamper more integrated approaches. In each government, targets have been
used to construct dominant strategic lines to align the decisions of other actors,
most notably in planning (see below). The strategies produced by the devolved
governments all acknowledge targets set at UK and EU levels, but target settings
reflect mainly ‘domestic’ processes: political agenda setting, along with assess-
ments of the renewable energy resources available within each territory and
projects in the pipeline. Indeed in the case of Northern Ireland, as it shares an elec-
tricity market with the Republic of Ireland, its targets tend to follow those adopted
by the Dublin government.
Significantly, we found no evidence that these processes of target setting had
been directed in any way by Westminster, which had certainly not compelled the
devolved governments to deliver any specific share of the national commitments.
The leaders of the devolved governments were co-signatories to the UK Renewable
Energy Roadmap for meeting EU targets, which incorporated the actions of the
devolved governments (DECC, 2011a) and adopted a language of ‘our shared
approach’ (DECC, 2011a, p. 3). This flexible relationship is revealing of the
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modes and objects of governance at play. One explanation is that central govern-
ment officers regarded the targets of the devolved governments as more ‘aspira-
tional’ (EngGOV6) and politically driven (‘an ambition more than say a target’,
EngGOV5) and by inference less meaningful or rigorous than the strategies West-
minster produced. Westminster’s accommodating attitude is also facilitated by
the fact that all three devolved governments have set targets for renewable
energy that exceed the UK requirement (see Table 2),9 motivated by the desire
to demonstrate leadership (especially in Scotland) and capture investment in a
sector seen as offering ‘green growth’. These ambitious, expansionist agendas
obviated any incentive on Westminster to impose a dominant strategic line on
the devolved governments.
There is an important further point: the very scale of the targets helps to
constitute the objects to be governed. The ambitions of Welsh and Scottish
Governments to generate more renewable energy than is required to meet dom-
estic demand (i.e., for ‘export’) inevitably require significant investment in
large-scale generation projects, coupled with major grid reinforcement. Since
1998, renewable energy expansion in the devolved areas has occurred mainly
through large-scale onshore wind10 which, given its potential for landscape
impacts and public opposition (Wu¨stenhagen et al., 2007), places a premium on
the capacities of states to render land available for development and manage
social responses (see discussion in Wolsink, 2004). This in turn has implications
for other modes of governing, particularly planning as we discuss further on.
Of course, targets do not describe ‘reality’ (Eadham, 2012) but their achieve-
ment, or failure to achieve them, can affect the credibility of the government that
institutes them. By 2013, the share of electricity generated by renewables in the UK
had reached 15% (DECC, 2014). Figure 1 shows the volumes of renewable energy
capacity installed in each part of the UK, and Table 3, below, a breakdown by tech-
nology. Scotland has seen significant renewable energy growth, enabling the Scot-
Table 2. Renewable energy targets and aims of the devolved governments
Target (at November 2014) (a)
Example of previous target
(year set) (b) Key sources
UK level 15% of energy from
renewable sources by 2020
10% of electricity generated
from renewables by 2010
(2000)
(a) DECC (2011a)
(b) Department of Trade
and Industry (2000)
Northern
Ireland
40% of electricity
consumption sourced from
renewables by 2020
Ensuring that 12% of
electricity is generated
from indigenous sources
by 2012 (2008)
(a) DETI (2010)
(b) Nigel Dodds, Energy
Minister, Northern
Ireland Executive, 10
January 2008
Scotland Matching 100% of Scottish
electricity consumption with
renewables by 2020
18% of electricity generated
from renewable sources by
2010, rising to 40% by 2020
(a) Scottish Government
(2011)
(b) Scottish Executive
(2003)
Wales Meeting the equivalent of
twice 2010 Welsh electricity
consumption from
renewables by 2025
(see note 8)
Renewable electricity
production targets for
Wales of 4TWh per annum
for 2010 and 7TWh for 2020
(2005)
(a) WAG (2010)
(b) WAG (2005)
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tish Government to meet a succession of its own renewable energy targets, an out-
turn which has fed back into the credibility that Scottish Governments have
enjoyed with DECC officials and ministers, as well as the energy industry. By con-
trast, Wales has seen sluggish development rates since devolution, contributing to
a wider perception that Welsh Governments are ‘good at setting visions . . . but
they are not really delivering’ (WalesTRA1, WalesGOV4).
3.2. Follow the Money
If the production of new strategies suggests that there is an emerging territorial
integration around renewable energy at devolved government level (Hodson &
Marvin, 2013), other modes of governing show how national (UK) action con-
tinues to frame the effects of governance rescaling. This is apparent from
systems of market support, designed to give additional incentives to renewable
energy investment and which has been critical in enabling these technologies to
expand and compete (Szarka, 2007). In the UK, national government retains
prime responsibility for designing systems of market support, which then work
Figure 1. Installed renewable energy capacity 2003–2013 (MW). Source: DECC, 2014b.
Table 3. Installed capacity of renewable electricity sites, 2013
Hydro Wind
Wave
and tidal
Landfill
gas
Sewage
gas
Other
bioenergy
Solar
PV
MWe
total
England 31.7 5154.6 0.1 869.5 179.1 2565.9 2336.7 11137.7
Wales 151.3 771.0 – 45.5 13.1 38.1 143.6 1162.9
Scotland 1501.0 4701.2 5.9 114.3 5.6 143.1 119.1 6590.1
Northern
Ireland
8.5 579.3 1.2 12.4 0.2 14.5 28.2 644.3
Other sites – 2.9 – – – – 152.3 155.2
UK total 1692.6 11209.0 7.2 1041.7 198.0 2761.9 2779.8 19690.2
Source: DECC (2014b, p. 50).
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by acting on the incentive structures of potential renewable energy developers.
However, simply describing market support as ‘centralized’ obscures the multiple
practices and relations which hold it together across the UK.
The main system of market support in place since 2002 (2005 in Northern
Ireland) has involved the trading of Renewables Obligation Certificates
(ROCs).11 This requires electricity suppliers to achieve increasing targets of renew-
able energy (the ‘Obligation’). Suppliers do this by purchasing ROCs, which are
issued to renewable generators in respect of production of units of electricity gen-
erated, or otherwise suffer financial penalties for every unit of energy they fall
short. The penalty payments are recycled to the holders of ROCs. Because the
task of funding the purchase of ROCs falls to electricity suppliers, the cost is
passed on to consumers’ bills. The Renewable Obligation (RO) has two key
spatial dimensions. The first dimension is cross-UK integration. ROCs can be
transferred between the different parts of the UK, making the RO operate effec-
tively as a single market within the UK. The second dimension is that, in oper-
ational terms, the RO was formally broken up into separate mechanisms for
England/Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This gave the Scottish Govern-
ment operational powers to vary the levels of ROC support for different renew-
able energy technologies, enjoying comparable powers in this sphere to the
Northern Ireland Executive.
The governments of Scotland and Northern Ireland have exploited this flexi-
bility. Scottish Governments led the UK in setting bands that awarded more ROCs
per megawatt to wave and tidal stream power, to incentivize the extra costs of
those emergent technologies in which the Scottish Government located great
potential. The Northern Ireland Renewable Obligation (NIRO) has a special
banding for small-scale renewables (,500 kW) and farm-scale anaerobic diges-
tion. These actions may yet precipitate distinctive technological pathways in
renewable energy development between these parts of the UK. To date,
however, the vast majority of renewable energy capacity installed in Scotland
and Northern Ireland has been from the well-developed technology of onshore
wind, the volume of which reflects cross-UK integration of ROC markets. The
cost of complying with the RO is ultimately paid for by all UK electricity consu-
mers, 85% of which live in England, the most populous part of the UK. Thus,
the devolved governments have seen rapid expansion of onshore wind within
their territories because developers exploit the UK-wide pool of financial support.
The factors reinforcing the national (UK) reach of market support as a mode
of governing are revealed further by the programme of Electricity Market Reform
started in 2010, and the limited extent to which the devolved governments have
offered resistance. Westminster began working towards replacing the RO with a
new system of market support for low-carbon generation; Contracts for Difference
(CfD). The creation of CfD reflected the desire to securitize investment in particu-
lar objects—large, risky low-carbon energy technologies like nuclear power—and
also to reduce costs compared to the RO. On the face of it, the devolved govern-
ments had good reasons to be opposed. The new system of market support will
be more centralized in its operation than the RO, as CfD will be drawn up treating
the UK as a single market, thus removing what little operational control Scotland
previously possessed. There is also widespread concern that the new support
system favours nuclear development, and will disadvantage new renewable
energy capacity (Friends of the Earth, 2014; Harvey, 2012), both antithetical to
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the goals of the post-2007 Scottish Governments, led by the SNP, keen to expand
renewables but opposed to nuclear new build in Scotland (SNP, 2011).
In practice, the Scottish Government was initially critical of the reform propo-
sals12 but did not sustain its opposition. One factor is that, as indicated above,
Scottish politicians realize that their ambitions to become a major European pro-
ducer of renewable energy depends on being able to tap a UK-wide pool of
market support, as CfD like the RO that preceded it is paid for by all UK electricity
consumers via their bills (Toke, Sherry-Brennan, Cowell, Ellis, & Strachan, 2013).
The situation for the Northern Ireland Executive is similar. In principle, it has the
autonomy to design its own systems of market support but has agreed to join the
CfD system while retaining the right to negotiate a different strike rate to reflect
local conditions. The Welsh Government has never had powers in this sphere
and has little officer capacity to engage in detailed discussions, but its main nego-
tiating position has been to press for parity of treatment across the devolved gov-
ernments to prevent Wales from ‘losing out’ (Welsh Assembly Government
[WAG], 2012).
By tracing the operation of systems of market support, we can see how finan-
cial dependencies serve to maintain the centralized nature of market support,
even where the devolved governments might have had an interest in attuning
arrangements to local conditions (and, in Northern Ireland, the powers to do
so). We consider further how the particular form of financial support has, when
coupled with ambitious renewable energy goals, shaped the objects of renewable
energy provision. The consequences of devolution for the operation of planning
are addressed next.
3.3. Planning and Consenting
Planning (by which we mean land-use or spatial planning) is a more visibly multi-
scale process, which incorporates opportunities for publics and interest groups to
engage in decision-making at a variety of levels. It is also a mode of governing in
which there is more explicit attention to how renewable energy might be recon-
ciled with other environmental, social and economic goals bound up with the
use of land. Since these goals may potentially limit the realization of renewable
energy ambitions (Ellis, Cowell, Warren, Strachan, & Szarka, 2009), it is within
planning that dominant strategic lines are often clearest as governments act to
align the decisions of developers, local planning authorities and other actors
around the delivery of particular objects (Cowell & Owens, 2006; Murdoch &
Marsden, 1995; Wolsink, 2004). This alignment work is particularly apparent
around the most controversial objects, onshore wind and major new grid
reinforcement.
Electricity infrastructure in the UK has long been treated by the state as an
object of strategic significance. From the days of nationalization through into
the privatized era, consent for larger electricity-generating stations and major
grid lines has been issued by central government, rather than local government
as with most planning applications. Over time, this centralization has been over-
lain with measures to accelerate the delivery of ‘nationally important infrastruc-
ture’, culminating in the 2008 Planning Act and subsequent amendments
(Owens & Cowell, 2010). Under these reforms, National Policy Statements were
drawn up by central government to specify the ‘need’ for certain categories of
major infrastructure, including energy. Consent processes were still to be
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managed by specialized, central units but under strict time-frames, in which the
need for infrastructure cannot normally be questioned as individual projects
come forward. As noted above, under devolution the governments for Northern
Ireland and Scotland acquired responsibility for exercising these planning
powers, confining the direct reach of recent reforms to England and Wales.
Yet all of the devolved governments have adjusted consenting as a mode of gov-
ernance in line with discourses of streamlining delivery (Ellis, Cowell, Sherry-
Brennan, Strachan, & Toke, 2013), with local conditions—especially beliefs
about the likelihood of local resistance—shaping how far each government has
intervened to steer project decisions.
Northern Ireland has maintained very high approval rates for renewable
energy applications—often exceeding 90%. One factor is that all planning appli-
cations for renewable energy in Northern Ireland are currently determined cen-
trally by the Department of the Environment (DoE) and not by local
government. Another is that Northern Ireland sees generally low levels of political
involvement in planning and few local objections compared to other parts of the
UK. In this setting a positive, pro-development stance towards renewables has
been achieved with planning policies (DoE, 2009) that take a more liberal cri-
teria-based approach than seen elsewhere in the UK.
Approval rates in Scotland are second only to Northern Ireland, and one can
see components of a dominant strategic line operating. The Scottish Government
has drawn up National Planning Frameworks, which map the broad location of
key infrastructure projects (Scottish Government, 2009), designates them as
‘national developments’ and sets out why they are needed. This proved helpful
to the delivery of an upgraded grid line from Beauly to Denny through the
heart of the Scottish Highlands, designed to allow more renewable energy to be
supplied from northern sites. Although the proposal was affected by protracted
conflict, its strategic endorsement by the Scottish Government (by listing it in
National Planning Frameworks) helped potential investors retain confidence
that it would be built. Their confidence was also helped by the fact that consents
for larger projects (generating stations of 50 MW or over, major grid projects) are
determined by the Scottish Government. The Scottish Governments have also
been prepared to use their powers of national-to-local coordination to assist or
occasionally discipline local planning authorities into taking stances that
support the Scottish Government’s ambitious renewable energy targets; for
example local authorities contemplating restrictive planning policies for new
wind farms have been politely but firmly dissuaded13 (ScotQGO1 and
ScotNGO3).
The Welsh Government has taken the most explicit steps to use planning to
construct a dominant strategic line, tying renewable energy targets to particular
spaces and it has done so for a particular object, onshore wind. In 2005, it insti-
gated a national zoning framework to create a supportive policy context for
large-scale wind energy development (25 MW or above), demarcating seven
zones of upland Wales where there would be a presumption in favour of such
developments (WAG, 2005). This strategy reflects political judgements that it
would be desirable to take an ‘all Wales view’ of the most environmentally appro-
priate sites of wind power development rather than simply reacting to developers’
choices, and that local planning authorities would be too sensitive to local protests
without such direction (Cowell, 2007).
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The zones certainly stimulated developer interest, attracting applications for
more than 2000 MW of onshore wind capacity, much more than was originally
envisaged, including a significant increase in the size of wind energy projects.
However, this unintended co-evolution of modes of governing and objects has
had problematic effects. One issue was that the resulting concentration of devel-
opment and environmental impacts intensified resistance from the public, local
councils and countryside protection organizations, especially to the new high
voltage grid connections the wind energy investment would need. Second, this
upscaling of wind farm applications means that many exceed 50 MW in capacity,
for which consents are issued by Westminster not by the Welsh Government and,
moreover, Westminster is not bound to determine applications in line with the
spatial guidance or targets of Welsh planning policy (DECC, 2011b, para 2.2.1).
This has blurred the Welsh Government’s capacity to steer the development of
wind farms in its territory.
Arguably it is in England that planning, as a mode of governing for renewable
energy, has come under greatest pressure; especially so for onshore wind, such
that the polarity of previous dominant strategic lines has started to reverse.
Prior to 2010, English planning policy sought to ensure that renewable
energy applications were treated positively by local planning authorities, sup-
ported—albeit rather timidly—by targets and spatial guidance (Power &
Cowell, 2012).14 However, in 2010 the election of a Conservative Party-dominated
coalition government, more sceptical about renewables, enabled the localized
opposition to wind farms that had grown since the 1990s to more effectively
upscale its influence (Rootes, 2013) through Westminster politicians. The planning
ministry responded by removing much of the strategic governance architecture
created by its predecessors, and issuing instead policies that supported local coun-
cils wishing to zone for wind (Department of Communities and Local Govern-
ment [DCLG], 2012), and requiring greater pre-application consultation by
developers with local communities (DECC and DCLG, 2013), alongside loose
but assertive talk of allowing local communities a ‘veto’ over onshore wind pro-
posals in their area.15
Brief mention should be made of offshore wind, a growing component of
renewable energy capacity in England. Although individual schemes have
become controversial with the wider public, generally speaking, governance pro-
cesses are dominated by organized stakeholders. DECC and the Crown Estates
play pivotal roles across the UK, in organizing the licensing of areas of the sea
that can be exploited (Jay, 2010). The Scottish Government is viewed favourably
for constructing a simpler framework for managing project consents than other
parts of the UK (EngCOM1), but consent rates generally have been high, with
development costs and (cross-UK) market support rates being clearer determi-
nants of development rates than the precise form of planning and consenting pro-
cesses (Inglethorpe, 2014).
Planning reveals important but divergent developments in the governance
rescaling of renewable energy, in which the objects of governance matter. For
renewable energy generally, all the UK governments—national and devolved—
frame the role of planning primarily as one of delivery, but distinctive modes of
governing have arisen around onshore wind. Scotland and Wales have responded
to the potential for opposition by reinforcing hierarchical modes of governing, to
align local decision-makers with national objectives. In England, modes of govern-
ing are shifting towards a position in which locally defined environmental and
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community ‘capacities’ to accommodate wind energy are becoming more impor-
tant governance objects, to which the delivery of wind energy is subservient. As a
former Minister put it, ‘the public will decide what the balance is’16 between
onshore wind and other energy technologies.
4. Discussion—the Effects of Rescaling Energy Governance?
The analysis above has traced the effects of devolution in the UK, as a particular
set of rescaling processes, on the governance of renewable energy. Sensitivity to
the different modes of governing at work and the variable scope they offer for
flexibility has helped understand the capacity of the devolved governments to
construct new arrangements to support this sector. Nevertheless, one may legiti-
mately question how far outcomes can be explained by reference to governance
scale without attention to the actors engaged at each government level, and
how they shape policy-making processes. To explore this perspective, we reflect
briefly on the policy networks surrounding renewable energy in each devolved
government (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992).
The particular experience of Scotland undoubtedly warrants closer examin-
ation, as in the years following devolution it witnessed rapid expansion of renew-
able energy despite possessing fewer formal powers over key modes of governing
than Northern Ireland or England/Westminster. The constellation of actors
around the energy sector in Scotland does show distinctively conducive qualities.
Party politics is clearly a factor, in that devolution facilitated the growing power of
the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), which has long seen the energy economy as
central to Scotland’s future independence, and positions renewable energy expan-
sion prominently within this agenda (WalesTRA, ScotCOM1, ScotQGO1 and
ScotGOV3, 4 and 6). The SNP formed a minority Scottish Government in 2007
and a majority in 2011. However, the ability of Scottish Governments to act has
also been helped by the fact that renewable energy has enjoyed cross-party
support across successive Scottish administrations, bolstered by the presence of
major energy businesses within Scotland and the success with which Scottish
Governments have brought them into the policy-making process (ScotADV1,
ScotQGO1, ScotNGO3 and ScotGOV4). This sustained elite coherence around
renewable energy has helped stabilize a consistently supportive policy environ-
ment, to legitimize Scottish Governments in making assertive use of the powers
available, and marginalize those voices critical of renewables expansion. The posi-
tive renewable energy outcomes in turn gave Scottish Governments a more
powerful status in UK-wide policy networks, notably with DECC in Westminster
(EngCOM1, EngGOV6 and EngGOV8). One consequence of this is that Scotland
secured a revised system of grid transmission charges that would cheapen the
cost of ‘exporting’ Scottish renewables outputs to England (Toke et al., 2013).
Devolution has not led to the formation of such cohesive policy communities
around renewable energy expansion in the other devolved territories of the UK. In
Northern Ireland, the prolonged negotiation of the peace settlement and the
ongoing dominance of sectarian politics cast a shadow over other roles of govern-
ment, including that of energy. Consequently, renewable energy has been empha-
sized less by the Northern Ireland Executive, and power-sharing arrangements
have created significant problems for cross-departmental working on energy
issues. In Wales, onshore wind development has become the subject of party pol-
itical competition and relations between Welsh Governments and the renewables
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industry were weak for much of the period 1999–2011 (WalesGOV4, WalesGOV7
and WalesNGO2).
If attention to policy networks helps to enhance our understanding of how
modes of governing emerge and evolve, attention to the objects of governance
can explain why it is that the presence or absence of the kind of coherent policy
communities seen in Scotland actually matters. By 2014, devolution had done
little to challenge or displace the dominance of the bulk power/international
utility model of renewable energy development in the UK (Szarka, 2007), in
which most capacity is developed in large projects by major companies. Indeed,
the dominance of such objects has been reinforced by three of the modes of gov-
erning that we analysed. Through their strategies and target setting, all of the
devolved governments position renewable energy primarily as a major source
of inward investment and—in the cases of Scotland and Wales–production for
‘export’, rather than a component of agendas of energy autonomy, resilience
and eco-efficiency. This assumes large-scale provision of new supply. The
systems of market support (first the RO, then CfD), in their complexity and
emphasis on competition, favour large, incumbent businesses such as inter-
national utilities better able to raise finance and accommodate the risk, over
smaller, independent operators (Lauber, 2012; Woodman & Mitchell, 2011). As
noted above, the devolved governments were unable or unwilling to challenge
Westminster proposals in this field.
The Achilles Heel of this form of development is social acceptability. The size
of the plant, the environmental impacts and the limited extent to which they gen-
erate benefits for ‘host’ communities encourage the perception that projects are
exploitative and undesirable, enflaming public opposition. This has been
especially true of onshore wind, but public opposition has also arisen with
some offshore wind projects and large field-scale solar and various biofuel
schemes. Given that the devolved governments operate at a level ‘closer’ to the
publics they serve, one might have expected them to be more sensitive (than West-
minster) to public disquiet over renewable energy development (Dahl, 1994).
However, as our analysis has shown, any sensitivity to public reaction has not
been translated by the devolved governments into serious questioning of the
objects to be governed. (The only exception to this is the long-standing opposition
of the SNP to new nuclear generation in Scotland (Cairney, 2012; Hamilton, 2002).)
The governance effects of this lack of questioning is most apparent in planning—
the mode of governing most open to modification by the devolved governments.
As we showed above, the devolved governments have given more attention to
reinforcing dominant strategic lines around the delivery of large-scale energy pro-
jects within their territories17 than to enhancing public engagement in renewable
energy development.
So, it is because of the potential for social conflict created around the domi-
nant objects of renewable energy governance that tight policy communities
became important, to maintain a consistent framework for support in the face
of resistance, and this a characteristic exhibited best in Scotland. Yet we can see
how the efforts of the devolved governments to deliver renewable energy
remain vulnerable to faltering social and political acceptability around renewable
energy at England/UK level since 2010. As we noted above, England has seen
mounting public disquiet over the expansion of onshore wind in rural areas.
Although much opposition was expressed in the planning system, where West-
minster writ applies mostly to England, opposition has crossed into other
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modes of governing which operate across the UK. Political pressure accelerated
moves to shift the balance of financial support from renewable towards nuclear
power and from onshore to offshore wind. It also galvanized UK government
opposition to the EU setting binding national renewable energy targets post-
2020, in favour of broader carbon-reduction targets in which ‘the market deter-
mines the energy mix’.18 What we have seen, in effect, is the gradual erosion of
renewable energy as a distinctive object of governance at Westminster level, as
reflected in the recasting and dismantling of key modes of governing—targets,
planning and finance. In so doing, of course, it threatens to remove key com-
ponents that the devolved governments had been using to construct a dominant
strategic line behind renewables within their territories. In the longer term, this
may make some of their ambitious goals harder to achieve (Toke et al., 2013).
Before turning to our conclusions, we add a few modest caveats to this
account. Emerging alongside the growth in large-scale renewable energy capacity,
the UK has seen a proliferation of small-scale sustainable energy initiatives
(Rydin, Turcu, Guy, & Austin, 2013). Westminster, Welsh and Scottish Govern-
ments have all also been interested in ensuring that communities benefit from
energy investment, including promoting community ownership of renewable
energy, and have developed various initiatives to do so, often with much learning
between territories. Arguably Scotland has gone furthest of the UK governments
by creating a target of securing 500 MWof local and community-owned renewable
energy by 2020 (Scottish Government, 2011). Nevertheless, across all parts of the
UK, the micro-scale, community renewable sector has been positioned mainly
as an adjunct of the dominant bulk power/international utility model (Szarka,
2007). With the exception of solar photovoltaics, it has struggled to expand in
the face of modes of governing attuned more closely, as noted above, to the deliv-
ery of larger-scale projects.
5. Conclusions
Renewable energy has proven to be an insightful context for examining the effects
of devolution within the British state. During the period 1998–2013, a significant
amount of the renewable energy development in the UK took place in the terri-
tories of the devolved governments. Even though energy policy is not formally
fully devolved in all these areas, renewables have been made the subject of a suc-
cession of strategies by the devolved governments, who have altered other gov-
ernance arrangements to support the delivery of ambitious goals: in the settings
of market support (Northern Ireland and Scotland) and in the orchestration of
planning processes (all). The institutional changes are modest in extent; an
outcome attributable in large part to obdurate features of the governing arrange-
ments for renewable energy, which remain dominated by the actions of Westmin-
ster and its pre-devolution handling of energy in ‘the regions’. In some respects
interconnections between the levels has been supportive of renewable energy
expansion, notably in allowing a UK-wide pool of financial support to be chan-
nelled to projects in the devolved areas, and the way that planning regimes
have been tailored to different territorial circumstances. In others, as in the conse-
quences of faltering support for onshore wind in England, the vulnerabilities built
into these interconnections are also apparent.
Our analytical approach to rescaling has proven useful in tracing and explain-
ing what has happened in the renewable energy sector. The relevance of consider-
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ing multiple modes of governing is clear. For example, our analysis showed that
while new strategies can form a visible product of governance activity at a newly
empowered level, the ability to deliver on these strategies depends on the inter-
play with other, more impactive modes of governing—in this case financial
support and planning. Although our analysis is retrospective, the entanglements
of multiple modes of governing can also be used to interpret debates about the
scope for further devolution (or decentralization) in the energy sphere, and the
fragmentary, partial effects of rescaling more widely. Thus, in Scotland, both
those in favour of and those against independence in the autumn 2014 referendum
supported modes of governance in energy markets, transmission pricing and
financial support for renewable energy that retain a high degree of integration
between Scottish and UK levels (Davey, 2012; Scottish Government, 2013).
Through our theoretical approach, we have identified some relationships of
wider relevance to understanding the scalar structure of environmental govern-
ance. We have shown how objects of governance can mediate the relevance of
rescaling to governance outcomes—in effect, to show how and when scale
matters (Moss & Newig, 2010). Renewable energy in the UK, in the period up
until 2010, showed that rescaling the distribution of powers matters less where
key actors at different levels share the same beliefs about future energy pathways.
We observed much coherence between levels around the rolling out of large-scale
renewable energy facilities, with governance variation mainly in calculations
around how precisely modes of governing might reinforce delivery of such
objects. One might argue that renewable energy has different qualities to other
sites in which governance rescaling has been examined, in that cross-border
effects are not really ‘spillovers’ (in the sense of pollution) but issues about how
cross-boundary systems of infrastructure, markets and regulation construct the
scope for intervention and agency at different levels . Yet this concern with
cross-boundary infrastructural and regulatory systems is also pertinent to other
governance areas, where the persistence of sectoral norms affects the capacity of
newly empowered territorial scales to forge distinctive, cohesive agendas.
Jessop’s concept of a dominant strategic line, constructed to align diverse
actors and networks around the delivery of particular objects, has conceptual
value in our analysis, but needs careful interpretation in practice. Observing the
ingredients of governmentality, in the form of regimes of targets, does not
always entail the exercise of disciplinary power across political levels. Yet renew-
ables also remind us of Jessop’s wider point, that all modes of governing are prone
to failure, to which we would add that creating dominant strategic lines becomes
most relevant where objects of governance are most contested and where govern-
ments believe that other modes of governing are unlikely to deliver important
goals through this conflictual terrain without additional steering. Our obser-
vations here echo those made in other sectors (Cowell & Murdoch, 1999) and
warrant further investigation.
In generalizing from our findings, we recognize the ways in which our
specific research focus influenced the findings. Devolution in the UK is a very par-
ticular form of rescaling, which—to the time of writing at least19—represents a
transfer of who exercises powers at a given level, for a territory, rather than necess-
arily a redistribution of powers to or from that level. Perhaps because of this con-
tinuity, there is a strong cultural predisposition towards pragmatic relations
between the devolved governments and the centre, only rarely politicizing juris-
dictional issues (Cairney, 2012). Such a setting is unlikely perhaps to see rescaling
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unleash dramatic policy alternatives, at least in the short term. Coupled with this,
we have focused on energy objects (large-scale electricity provision) which have
perhaps the greatest path dependencies, with the requirements of grid network
support, markets and finance strongly reinforcing logics of spatial integration
rather than deviation. Alternative, ‘softer’ energy pathways (Lovins, 1977) such
as the pursuit of 100% Renewable Energy Regions20 might well put a greater
premium on effective urban or regional level action (Hvelplund, Mo¨ller, & Sper-
ling, 2013), to better knit together flows of electricity, heat and transport energy.
However, rather than simply imagine how rescaled institutional arrangements
might better foster more radical sustainable development pathways, it is impor-
tant to understand why rescaling alone can be insufficient for dislodging domi-
nant systems of resource provision and how core modes of governing may
endure after rescaling has taken place.
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Notes
1. We refer to these territories as ‘sub-national’ rather than regional, to avoid confusion with inter-
national relations conventions that define ‘regional’ as a scale immediately above the ‘national’
(see Van den Brande et al., 2012).
2. This limited political attention may also reflect the fact that, following years of emphasis on lib-
eralization and privatization within the UK electricity system, by the late 1990s there was emer-
ging consensus between the main parties that formal, state energy policy was largely
unnecessary or, at least, not a priority (Helm, 2003).
3. We make greater use of the simpler formulation of ‘modes of governing’ from Bulkeley et al.
(2005), concerned with ‘the means through which governing power is exercised’, rather than
the more specific way in which the conjunctions of modes and objectives is developed in Bulkeley
et al. (2007). In this latter paper, in the sphere of waste, they identify four main modes: waste dis-
posal, waste diversion, eco-efficiency and waste as a resource. Our emphasis on modes of govern-
ance within the sphere of renewable energy may thus owe more to the formulations of Treib et al.
(2005), which equate modes with policy instruments. Such simplification suits our context, in
which we are seeking to pursue a four-way comparison, but our analysis does look beyond instru-
ments narrowly construed to consider the range of processes that hold instruments in place, and
the relationship between modes and objects of governance remains centre stage.
4. The Welsh Office, the Scottish Office and the Northern Ireland Office respectively.
5. We use ‘Westminster’ as shorthand for the political institutions and policy-making capacity of the
UK government, most of which is exercised from London.
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6. To preserve interviewee anonymity, we use a code system to identify specific interviews. ‘Scot’
means interviewee was based in Scotland, ‘NI’ in Northern Ireland, ‘Wales’ in Wales and ‘Eng’
in England or UK level. ‘Gov’ indicates that the interviewee works for the government (officer
or politicians), ‘Adv’ that they are an advisor, ‘LPA’ that they work for a local planning authority;
‘NGO’ that they are from a non-governmental environmental group; ‘Com’ that they work for a
company, ‘Tra’ for a trade association and ‘QGO’ that they work for a quango. The number at the
end differentiates interviewees within the same category of respondent.
7. Prime Minister at the point in time referred to.
8. The language is softer in Wales where the 2020 goals are referred to as ‘aims’, not targets, and the
2012 update to the UK Renewable Energy Roadmap states that ‘(t)he Welsh Government does not
have devolved renewable energy targets’ (DECC, 2012, para 2.15).
9. Although the framing of the renewable energy targets in terms of ‘domestic’ electricity consump-
tion obscures the fact that Wales and Scotland are significant producers and exporters of gas and
coal-generated electricity.
10. The sizeable volumes of hydro-electricity generation capacity in Scotland pre-date devolution.
11. We take the RO process to be the main market support mechanism for renewable energy coinci-
dent with the period of devolution. We set aside the preceding Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation, on
the grounds that by comparison with the RO it incentivised relatively little new renewable
energy capacity. There is also a Feed-in Tariff (FiT), introduced in 2008, which supports small-
scale renewable energy development (mostly under 5MW). The FiT is funded by the addition
of a precept on the bills of electricity consumers, and is administered by Ofgem in a spatially
consistent way across England, Scotland and Wales. We also set this aside, as our focus is on
larger scale facilities.
12. Correspondence, Alex Salmond to Chris Huhne, 12 July 2011.
13. Letters from Derek Mackay, Minister for Local Government and Planning of the Scottish Govern-
ment, to Moray Council and Fife Council, 6 August 2012.
14. Under Labour governments during the first decade of the twenty-first century, Westminster did
work to construct a hierarchy of national and sub-national targets for the English regions, but
this whole apparatus disappeared with the 2010 Coalition Government and the abolition of
both regional government and most targets (Power & Cowell, 2012).
15. The reality of these announcements may amount to nothing like a local veto (Early, 2013), but the
Conservative Party subsequently issued statements proclaiming that its manifesto for the 2015
election would introduce such a measure.
16. Lord Deben, quoted in Murray (2014) ‘Committee on climate change insists onshore wind still has
a role to play in cost-effective energy mix’, Business Green, 28 May. http://businessgreen.com/bg/
news/2346982, accessed 29 May 2014.
17. The only (partial) exception to this pattern is that the Welsh and Scottish Governments have
shown a greater inclination to use spatialized policies for on-shore energy and other infrastructure
than Westminster, in turn giving future national development scenarios greater tangibility and
attracting more responses. However, the devolved governments also broadly share the UK gov-
ernment’s support for European Commission moves to further accelerate the decision-making
process for TENs (Trans-European Connections) like cross-border electricity grids and pipelines,
which would further interconnect their energy markets but also frame national decision-making
processes within an EU Directive.
18. Ed Davey MP, Secretary of State for Climate Change, speech, 18 June 2013, Brussels. In the end, the
EU endorsed binding renewable energy targets beyond 2020, but for the EU as a whole not dis-
aggregated to individual member states.
19. November 2014.
20. http://www.go100percent.org/cms/index.php?id=3, accessed 17 June 2014.
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